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BUILDING A BUSINESS

Protecting products versus platforms
Jacob S Sherkow
Choosing an IP protection regime depends on the type of company you are building.
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P

atents have long been the most important legal assets of biotech companies.
Increasingly, however, biotech firms find
themselves on one side of a divide: as either
traditional product companies or platform
companies. Given the differences between
these two types of business models, the merits
of intellectual property (IP) protection vary
between them. This article explores how those
differences relate to biotech startups and entrepreneurs seeking to protect their inventions.
Patents and trade secrets
Biotech companies have traditionally sought to
secure their intellectual assets using one of two
forms of IP: patents or trade secrets. Patents are
a time-limited, government-granted property
right. They prohibit others from making, using
or selling the invention claimed in the patent
during its term—currently in the United States,
20 years from the date it is filed with the US
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).
For several reasons, it is important to decide
early on in the development process whether to
protect a piece of innovation with patents or as
trade secrets. For patents, companies can stake
an early claim to new and useful technologies
by filing provisional patent applications—
often, simply, a rough, written description of
the invention. Should priority disputes arise
between competing inventions, a provisional
application has the added advantage of proving
that an inventor was the first to file a patent on
the described technology.
After filing a provisional patent application,
an inventor has one year to file a full, or complete, patent application. That application must
claim, in specific terms, the invention sought
to be patented. The claims then undergo
examination at the PTO. The Office ensures
that the claimed invention is new, useful and
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“nonobvious.” In addition, the application itself
must enable others to make and use the invention and must wholly disclose, to the public, the
invention sought to be patented.
Inventors who believe competitors have
reproduced or used their invention can enforce
their patents through the courts by suing for
patent infringement. Although filing patents
with the PTO is typically inexpensive—at
median, roughly $10,000, in addition to a few
thousand in maintenance fees—enforcing
them often costs millions. A patent infringement lawsuit concerning a product that generates at least $25 million per year in revenue—a
level easily obtained by successful biotech
products—will cost almost $7 million in
attorneys’ fees1. At the same time, litigation
often risks the validity of the patent sought to
be enforced. If a court finds, despite the PTO’s
examination, either that the application failed
to properly disclose the invention or that the
patent is not new, lacking in utility or obvious,
the patent must be invalidated—an occurrence
that happens in 43% of litigated cases2. Patents,
therefore, are costly, high-risk/high-reward
intellectual assets for biotech companies.
In contrast, trade secrets are cheap, lowrisk/low-reward forms of protection (Table 1).
Trade secrets do not require any form of assessment before a government agency. Rather,
they are simply any information that “derives
independent economic value” as a secret and
is subject to reasonable efforts to keep it so3.
These reasonable efforts may include requiring users or employees to sign confidentiality
agreements to keep the invention secret. Or
it may simply include a company’s refusal to
disclose the particulars of the invention to the
public. Owners of trade secrets may enforce
them against competitors when it appears that
their rivals have learned about them through
“improper means”—theft, bribery, misrepresentation, and so on.
Consequently, and unlike patents, trade
secrets remain indefinitely enforceable until
they are disclosed. This is famously illustrated

by Coca-Cola’s enduring 130-year-old—and
counting—secret formula4, and perhaps less
famously illustrated in the biotech context by
Wyeth’s 75-year-old-plus secret manufacturing
process for Premarin from mare urine5. Trade
secrets are also enforced through the courts,
and although it certainly is not cheap, it tends
to be less costly than patent litigation.
Generally, patents and trade secrets are
mutually exclusive. Because patents require
inventors to disclose their invention to the
public, and trade secrets demand inventors
engage in efforts to keep them clandestine, the
same invention cannot be protected by both a
patent and a trade secret. Nonetheless, many
successful companies parcel complex inventions into patentable and secret elements. For
example, a company developing liquid biopsy
technology—an assessment of patients’ cells
from a small sample of fluid tissue—may protect the biopsy device with patents, but the process and software for analyzing samples, with
trade secrets.
In addition to patents and trade secrets,
biotech companies have also made use of
data exclusivity—the right of a company
to refuse to share data from clinical trials.
Although not traditionally thought of as a
form of IP, data exclusivity operates much
like patents: a government-sanctioned freedom from competition for a fixed period of
time. Currently, new drugs not including
biologics receive five years of data exclusivity
from the US Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), during which generic manufacturers may not use those drugs’ underlying
clinical trial data to receive FDA approval6.
Biologics, by contrast, receive 12 years of
exclusivity from biosimilars7. These exclusivities come into force immediately upon
FDA approval; like trade secrets, they do
not require independent examination. But,
because data exclusivities require a p
 roduct
to be approved by the FDA, and because they
are typically shorter in duration than either
patents or trade secrets, they remain largely

VOLUME 34 NUMBER 5 MAY 2016 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY

BIOENTREPRENEUR / BUILDING A BUSINESS

Table 1 Patent or trade secret?
Patent

Trade secret

Regulatory exclusivities

Cost to obtain

$10,000–$30,000

Free

Millions of dollars

Cost to maintain

$3,150–$12,600

$1,000 to tens of thousands

Free

Ease of obtaining

Medium

Easy

Hard

Duration

20 years from date of filing

Potentially forever

3–12 years

Likelihood of loss

Medium

High

Low

Breadth of protection

Medium to high

Low to medium

Low

Cost of enforceability

$500,000–$10 million

$100,000–$2 million

Free

Ease of proving infringement

Medium

Difficult

Easy
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a secondary form of IP protection for earlystage b
 iotech companies.
Products versus platforms
Historically, biotech companies have focused
on developing and receiving regulatory
approval for a single product, directed to treat
one or a narrow group of indications. The
geneses of many now-large biotech companies serve as excellent examples. Genentech’s
(S. San Francisco, CA, USA) first product was
Protropin (somatrem), a recombinant growth
hormone indicated for certain types of dwarfism. Amgen (Thousand Oaks, CA, USA) got
its start by marketing Epogen (epoetin alfa),
recombinant erythropoietin indicated for
anemia. And Gilead’s (Foster City, CA, USA)
origins center on Viread (tenofovir), the antiretroviral used to treat HIV. These, and other
companies like them, are product biotech
companies—companies that seek to develop a
specific therapeutic product to be sold directly
to patients. Because of concentrations of expertise in a particular area, product biotechs tend
to focus their development efforts on a single
disease or disease indication. In addition,
these products tend to consist of treatments
themselves rather than diagnostics. At the
same time, product biotech companies do not
appear to be limited to certain classes of therapeutics: small-molecule therapeutics, vaccines
and complex biologics all fit within the product
company framework in biomedicine.
Many biotech startups, however, also
develop as platform biotechs—companies
seeking to develop technological platforms that
can be used for a variety of conditions. These
can consist of laboratory diagnostics, testing
devices, or broader therapeutic protocols or
modalities, such as particular forms of gene
therapy. Several notable and recently established biotech companies appear to fit more
firmly in this framework. Editas Medicine
(Cambridge, MA, USA), Caribou Biosciences
(Berkeley, CA, USA) and CRISPR Therapeutics
(Cambridge, MA, USA), for example, are all
focused on developing a variety of therapies
ultimately grounded in a single gene-editing

technology, CRISPR. Oxford Nanopore
(Oxford, UK) has developed an electronic
nanopore-based DNA-sequencing technology,
useful for gene sequencing.
The dichotomy between product and platform is not absolute. Some companies appear
to straddle the boundaries between product
and platform biotechs. Stemcentrx (S. San
Francisco, CA, USA), for example, has focused
its development efforts on specific monoclonal
antibodies used to target cancer stem cells—a
development pathway much in the traditional
mold of product biotech companies. But the
company is using such trials to investigate the
larger phenomenon of how stem cells operate across a variety of cancers in a variety of
tumors. In that sense, Stemcentrx could be
considered a platform biotech company as
well. Similarly, Sequenom (San Diego) has
developed a matrix-assisted laser desorption
ionization time-of-flight mass spectrometry
platform to validate gene variants from its
sequencing tests but the company also develops
and markets specific diagnostics for prenatal
diseases and malignancies.
Product and platform IP strategy
Product and platform biotechs operate in
vastly different regulatory and development
spaces. Notably, FDA regulation operates differently for product and platform biotechnologies. Products primarily fall under the legal
umbrella of drugs, biologics, or devices, classes
of therapeutics that must receive some form
of premarket approval from the FDA before
commercialization. Platform technologies, on
the other hand, have traditionally been characterized as laboratory-developed tests, a class
of product that—to date—the FDA has been
more lenient in regulating. Currently, such tests
do not need premarket approval from the FDA.
Aside from these regulatory differences,
development cycles between product and
platform biotech also differ. Product companies often develop a single therapeutic—a specific monoclonal antibody, for example—that
requires advance input from the FDA regarding the structure of surrounding clinical trials.
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As a result, there is little opportunity to develop
an improved or alternative version of the product without restarting the approval process.
Platform technology, however—without substantial regulatory constraints—can rapidly go
through phases of design, test, and build.
As a consequence of these differences, entrepreneurs should be aware of the pros and cons
of certain forms of IP protection for product
and platform biotech startups.
Patents. A tremendous amount of value for
product companies is often tethered to the
products’ exclusivity. In the small-molecule
drug context, for example, pioneer products
can lose >80% of their value upon the entry of
five or more competitors8. Patents, more than
other forms of IP, tend to provide that exclusivity to products.
This exclusivity operates in two ways. First,
with respect to small-molecule drugs, patents
present major stumbling blocks to competitors’ pathways for FDA approval. According to
the 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act—more popularly known
as the Hatch–Waxman Act—the FDA cannot
approve, for at least 30 months, any generic version of a brand manufacturer’s patented product that has not successfully invalidated, or
proven to not infringe on, the originator’s patents9. To that end, because patents are tethered
to regulatory approval, small-molecule product companies seeking to shield themselves
from generic competition will depend almost
entirely on the existence of patents covering the
drug, its formulation or methods of use.
Second, patents covering a pioneering
product provide strong disincentives to
generic competitors from launching during
the product’s patent term. As mentioned, the
cost of patent litigation is itself exorbitant.
Litigation costs aside, the harm of losing patent infringement suits can be severe. Generic
competitors who launch ‘at risk’ face the prospect of being entirely prohibited from entering
the market during the patent term. In addition,
they may have to pay damages to their pioneering rivals. For example, in one patent dispute
463

npg

© 2016 Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved.

BIOENTREPRENEUR / BUILDING A BUSINESS
concerning the drug Protonix (pantoprazole),
generic manufacturer Teva (Petach Tikva,
Israel) agreed to settle its patent dispute with
Pfizer (New York) for $2.15 billion10.
The advantages of patent protection are
less clear for platform biotechs. Because the
platform technology itself, as opposed to any
products derived from the technology, will not
typically require FDA premarket approval, patents do not operate in the platform space as
complements to regulatory barriers. In addition, because platform technologies tend to be
more complex than products from a patentclaiming perspective, competitors may find
it easier to develop technologies that work
around pioneer patents. For example, the patents covering Illumina’s (San Diego) MiSeqDx
clinical gene sequencing platform did little
to prevent ThermoFisher (Waltham, MA,
USA) from introducing its clinical sequencer,
the Ion Chef Instrument, or Qiagen (Hilden,
Germany), its GeneReader. Similarly, the patent portfolio of Stemcentrx will likely do little
to stave off potential competitors.
To be sure, many notable platform companies, including Editas and Oxford Nanopore,
have robust patent portfolios. But this diversity
in patent protection is likely a function of the
specific type of underlying technology itself,
rather than the regulatory or legal landscapes
in which platform companies operate. It appears
that the broader and more robust the technology, the more patents will likely provide cover
from competition. Fundamental technologies,
such as CRISPR, may at least initially require
some broad-based patents to quell competition
because the underlying science is well-known,
easily copied, and adaptable to a variety of
physical embodiments. Specific applications of
CRISPR are, even in its nascency, adaptable to
a variety of systems. The corollary, however, is
that the more that platform technologies are tied
to particular machinery, the less patents serve as
a bulwark against competitors; patents on specific machinery are often too narrow to be of
value. The robust diversity of next-generation
sequencing technologies seems to demonstrate
this. Platform technologies dependent on particular physical technologies will likely have to
compete on price, quality, and marketing—not
the scientific elegance of the technology itself11.
Trade secrets. Compared with patents, trade
secrets figure much less into a typical product
biotech’s IP portfolio. Most small-molecule
drugs can be easily manufactured once their
chemical structure is known; there are few
things about chemical synthesis worth keeping
secret. Biologics, however, do present a clear
exception to this rule in the product biotech
space. Because of the complexity of producing
464

biologics, companies often go out of their way to
guard the specifics of their manufacturing and
scale-up methods as trade secrets. Although the
active moieties themselves can sometimes be
reconstructed, current analytical methods make
comparing a follow-on biologic to a reference
biologic troublesome. As a consequence, biosimilar manufacturers must develop their own
methods of manufacture and validation, often at
great expense. Related to this, the FDA cannot
approve ‘biosimilars’ without rigorous assessments of their manufacturing methods. Product
biotechs developing large, complex biologics—
like monoclonal antibodies—can heavily rely on
trade secrets to ensure exclusivity12.
For platform technologies, trade secrets are
potentially their most powerful form of IP.
Like biologics, platform technologies that generate therapeutics can keep, as trade secrets,
their methods of creation, manufacture, and
validation. Competitors may know only the
broadest contours of their processes. And
even where these processes are well known,
platform companies’ employees’ tacit knowledge about scaling up such technology for
industrial operation may serve as significant
barriers to competitors13.
Similarly, platform technologies that employ
complex, analytical software in their products
or services, such as those of diagnostics companies, can often rely on trade secrets to shut
out serious competition. Because analytical
software is difficult to replicate, competitors
seeking to replicate a pioneer company’s testing
methods or devices may nonetheless be incapable of providing comparable data analysis14.
Where trade secrecy in analytical software
is paired with specialized devices, platform
technology companies can essentially create a
black box in which few competitors can hope
to operate. Indeed, this sort of combination
device–software trade secrecy is precisely what
originally drove valuations for Theranos15.
Data secrecy. Lastly, ‘data secrecy’—in the
form of both regulatory exclusivities and trade
secrets—can be similarly valuable to both
product and platform biotechs. Products, or
platforms that generate products, requiring
FDA approval benefit greatly from being able
to hide information obtained during clinical
trials from competitors. As a result, where premarket approval is otherwise required, competitors wishing to enter the same market as
pioneer manufacturers must submit their own,
costly clinical data. In many instances—such
as with the requirement that biosimilars must
demonstrate no “clinically meaningfully differences” to their reference drugs—this form of
data secrecy appears to be a powerful disincentive for competition16.

Both product and platform technologies
may also generate data themselves, such as
sequencing data or reports from diagnostics.
Both product and platform companies are
free to keep such data confidential. Indeed,
in some instances, the patient privacy regulations of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act may require them to
do so. Developing a robust data set concerning patient data, treatment and outcomes—a
form of IP unto itself—may provide an early
entrant important first-mover and exclusivity
advantages over competitors. This is perhaps
best illustrated by Myriad Genetics’ (Salt Lake
City, UT, USA) database of genetic variants.
Efforts to reproduce such databases, although
possible, are nonetheless arduous, and diagnostic companies can leverage such data—and
their competitors’ lack of it—in building brand
loyalty among clinicians17.
Developing your IP portfolio
Keeping the above points in mind, consider
below a few pieces of practical advice concerning IP protection for your biotech startup.
First, think about your company in the
future, not necessarily as it exists during the
present. IP protection is often irretrievable.
Information disclosed in a patent cannot be
later protected by trade secrets; information
kept as a trade secret for a long enough period
of time usually cannot later mature into a patent. Plan for your company’s IP needs when it
needs it the most—when your technology is
on the market.
Second, think about the saleable unit of what
you’re trying to develop—and whether it can
be used for other indications. Is it a drug that
appears useful to treat only a single condition?
Is it a machine that can diagnose a variety
of ailments? Is it a technique for developing
personalized therapies for a specific disease?
Tackling that question may make clear whether
your company is in the business of a defined
product or a broad-based platform.
Third, if your venture is more product
focused, think about getting early patents on the
specific product itself and, potentially, formulations and methods of using it. Patents may provide some shelter from competition after you
push your product through regulatory approval.
If the product is difficult to manufacture—if it
requires lesser-known technical know-how, or
if there are differences between manufacturing
it on clinical-trial and industrial scales—think
about keeping that knowledge secret, as many
successful biologics companies currently do.
Patents on these methods won’t necessarily
prevent generic approval, and trade secrets in
this area are more likely to stave off economically meaningful competition.
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Fourth, if your venture is more platform
focused, think about keeping as much secret
as possible. Try to convince outside users, testers, and developers of your technology to sign
appropriate confidentiality agreements, drafted
by a lawyer. In addition, don’t disclose too many
of the technical details of your technology in
investor pitches, scientific publications, or public talks. Try to keep the inner workings of your
platform secret. By contrast, if your platform
focuses on a device that can be easily reverse
engineered—like a desktop sequencer—it may
be worth applying for patents on your technology’s basic outline. But keep in mind that
such patents won’t be worth too much. If the
patents are drafted too broadly, they’re likely to
be invalidated in an infringement trial. If the
patents are drafted too narrowly, they’ll be easily worked around by your competitors.
Finally, if your product generates data
itself—for example, a diagnostic test product—
think ahead about mechanisms to use that
data, either as a proprietary platform or as a
licensed database that you can separately monetize. If you are later faced with competition

from competing services, clinicians may
choose your product over your competitors’
because of your head start in data aggregation.
Conclusion
Product and platform biotech companies,
despite their similarities, operate in substantially different spaces with respect to regulation
and IP. Patents, trade secrets and data exclusivities each benefit product and platforms differently. Patents, for example, will continue to be
critical to the development of product biotechnologies across therapeutic classes. But trade
secrets are likely to be of critical importance
for newly developing platform technologies.
Relatedly, data exclusivities of various forms—
from regulatory exclusivities to data secrecy—
will continue to be advantageous forms of IP
for both types of companies. Biotech companies
seeking to shield themselves from competition
should assess how their core technologies fit
within this IP framework.
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